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STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree entered on the 
7th day of December, 1987, together with an appeal from the Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial entered on the 25th day 
of February, 1988. The appeal is taken from the First Circuit 
Court, Box Elder County, Brigham City Department. This court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-4-11 (as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court error in not dismissing plaintiff's 
STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING CASE 
70A-1-20L General definitions. Subject to additional definitions con-
tained in the subsequent chapters of this act which are applicable to spe-
cific chapters or parts thereof, and unless the context otherwise requires, 
in this act: • . . 
(3) uAgreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in 
their language or by implication from other circumstances includ-
ing course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance 
as provided in this act (sections 70A-1 205 ^nd 70A-2-208). Whether 
an agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provi-
sions of this act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts 
(section 70A-1 103). (Compare "Contract.") . • • 
(19) "Good faith" means honesty iji fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned. . . . 
(37) "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fix-
tures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The 
retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstand-
ing shipment or delivery to the buyer (section 70A-2-401) is limited 
in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." The term also 
includes any interest of a buyer of account or chattel paper which 
is subject to chapter 9. The special property interest of a buyer of 
goods on identification of such goods to a contract for sale under 
section 70A-2-401 is not a "security interest," but a buyer may also 
acquire a "security interest" by complying with chapter 9. Unless 
a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title 
thereunder is not a "security interest" but a consignment is in any 
event subject to the provisions on consignment sales (section 
70A-2-326K Whether a lease is intended as security is to be deter-
mined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an 
option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended 
for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the 
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to 
become the owner of the property for no additional consideration 
or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended 
for security. 
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70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith. Every contract or duty within 
this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment. 
70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale 
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way 
of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indi-
cate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties 
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or 
by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient 
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the 
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quan-
tity of goods shown in such writing. . . . 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection 
(1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable . . . 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in 
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract 
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under 
this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or . . . 
70A-9-105. Definitions and index of definitions. 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires: . . . 
(1) "Security agreement" means an agreement which creates or 
provides for a security interest; 
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70A-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers 
both real and personal property. 
(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured 
party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except 
as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agree-
ment. He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise 
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure. If 
the collateral is documents the secured party may proceed either 
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. A secured 
party in possession has the rights, remedies and duties provided 
in section 70A-9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this 
subsection are cumulative. 
(2) After default, the debtor has the rights and remedies provided in 
this part, those provided in the security agreement and those pro-
vided in section 70A-9-2Q7. 
(3) To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties 
on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred 
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with 
respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) of 
section 70A-9-504 and section 70A-9-505) and with respect to 
redemption of collateral (section 70A-9-506) but the parties may by 
agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of 
these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable: 
(a) subsection (2) of section 70A-9-502 and subsection (2) of 
section 70A-9-5Q4 in so far as they require accounting for 
surplus proceeds of collateral; 
(b) subsection (3) of section 70A-9-504 and subsection (1) of 
section 70A-9-505 which deal with disposition of collateral; 
(c) subsection (2) of section 70A-9-505 which deals with accep-
tance of collateral as discharge of obligation; 
(d) section 70A-9-506 which deals with redemption of collateral; 
and 
(e) subsection (1) of section 70A-9-507 which deals with the 
secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part. 
(4) If the security agreement covers both real and personal property, 
the secured party may proceed under this part as to the personal 
property or he may proceed as to both the real and the personal 
property in accordance with his rights and remedies in respect of 
the real property in which case the provisions of this part do not 
apply. 
(5) When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the lien 
of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of 
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate back to the 
date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral. A 
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of the 
security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of this 
section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and there-
after hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this 
chapter. 
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70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default. 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the 
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the 
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make 
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured 
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a 
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collat-
eral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party 
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or 
otherwise. 
78-4-H. Appeal to Court of Appeals — County attorneys 
to represent state, city attorneys to represent mu-
nicipalities. 
Except as otherwise directed by § 78-2-2, appeals from final civil and crimi-
nal judgments of the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. The county 
attorney shall represent the interests of the state as public prosecutor in any 
criminal appeals from the circuit court. City attorneys shall represent the 
interests of municipalities in any appeals from circuit courts involving viola-
tions of municipal ordinances. 
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Rule 3. Commencement of action^ 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint 
with the court, or (2) by the service of a summons. If the action is commenced 
by the service of a summons, the complaint, together with the summons and 
proof of service thereof, must be filed within ten days after such service and a 
copy of the complaint shall be served upon or mailed to the defendant if his 
address is known; if unknown, a copy must be deposited with the clerk for 
him, or the action thus commenced shall be deemed dismissed and the court 
shall have no further jurisdiction thereof; provided, however, that the forego-
ing provision shall not change the requirement of § 12-1-8. Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
 m 
* *i 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a *hew trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any'of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions^ 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: - -
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. | 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. | 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant 
alleging that on the 7th day of June 1986 the defendant sold to 
the plaintiff certain farm equipment. The plaintiff alleged that 
he paid for the equipment the sum of $5,500.00, but the defendant 
failed to deliver the equipment, and the plaintiff was therefore 
damaged in the amount of $5,500.00. (R.l). The defendant filed a 
general answer denying that the defendant was indebted to the 
plaintiff in any amount, and alleging that the plaintiff owed 
$4,500.00 to the defendant under their contract. (R.3-4) 
On June 6, 1986, Carl Baker came to Dale Barnes1 equipment 
yard in Tremonton Utah, seeking to purchase certain farm 
equipment. He came after 5:00 o'clock, after the defendant's 
business office was closed. (T.12). Mr. Baker was interested in 
purchasing an International Harvester tractor, Model 706. He 
drove the tractor around the area (T.13) and also determined to 
buy a pair of John Deere Twin Rakes, Model 270 and 271, with rake 
cart. 
He agreed to pay the price of $10,000.00 for the equipment 
he purchased. (T.14) 
Mr. Baker and Mr. Barnes agreed that Mr. Baker would trade 
in a Heston swather 12 foot and an International Harvester side 
rake, and that he would be given a trade-in value of $5,500.00 
for the equipment traded in. (Exhibit 4) 
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OCT 3 1988 
WALTER G. h 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MANN, RETIRED 
September 29, 1988 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Carl Baker vs. Dale Barnes dba Barnes Equipment 
No. 880176-CA 
Gentlemen: 
In reviewing the Appellant's Brief we discovered that we had 
inadvertently placed the wrong names on two pages: 
1. On page 8, the last paragraph, the third line from the 
bottom, "Mr. Barnes" should be crossed out and "Mr. Baker" should 
be inserted. 
2. On page 9, line six, the word "Mr. Barnes" should be 
crossed out and "Mr. Baker" should be inserted. 
If it is possible to make those changes pursuant to this 
letter, I would appreciate it. If not, I could stop in Salt Lake 
and interlineate those changes. 
Very truly you^b, 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
By. 
JRT/tr 
si v ^ 
cc: Arden Lauritzen 
Mr. Barnes' equipment was subject to g. security interest at 
Zions Bank which was flooring his inventory, (T.38) 
Mr. Baker stated that he would obtain his own financing on 
the equipment, as he was working with his own bank, Commercial 
Security Bank, and would include this equipment in the financing 
he was arranging and would pay the balance to Mr. Barnes. (T.6) 
The parties never had a written document specifying the 
exact time in which the payment would be made, but Mr. Baker 
agreed that he would obtain his own financing within a reasonable 
time and pay Mr. Barnes within 60-90 days. (T.19). Mr. Baker 
further understood that interest normally begins 30 days after 
purchase and he would be obligated to pay some interest on the 
balance owed. (T.17) 
Mr. Barnes intended to retain an interest in the property 
until he was paid in full, and Mr. Baker understood that Mr. 
Barnes was retaining an interest in the property until he was 
paid. 
During the summer of 1986, Mr. Barnes repeatedly attempted 
to contact Mr. Baker to be paid, or to at least receive evidence 
that financing was in place or worked upon. Mr. Barnes1 
testimony was that during the months of July, August and 
September and October, that he tried to contact Mr. Barnes eight 
or ten times in person and perhaps 30 or 40 times on the 
telephone. (T.40). On two separate occasions Mr. Barnes 
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contacted Mr, Baker and gave him credit applications to finance 
the equipment through Zions Bank, (T.39) Mr. Baker (apparently 
without ever telling Mr. Barnes) disregarded the credit 
applications because he claimed he was going to work through his 
own bank, Commercial Security Bank. (T.61) 
Mr. Barnes had the use of the equipment during the entire 
crop growing season for the summer and fall of 1986. (T.26). 
After numerous attempts to contact Mr. Baker to obtain his 
money or at least obtain financing, Dale Barnes went to Cache 
Valley and repossessed the items sold. Mr. Barnes testified that 
occurred on November 15, 1986, (T.44) and Mr. Baker testified 
that it occurred on September 15, 1986. (T.55) The trial court 
found that the repossession occurred in September, 1986. 
On May 6, 1987, Dale Barnes sent a letter to Carl Baker 
informing him that if he would pay off the balance, he could have 
the equipment returned. (Exhibit 1). On May 8, 1987, Dale 
Barnes sent a second letter to Carl Baker informing him that he 
could still have the equipment if he would obtain financing and 
pay the same off. (Exhibit 2) 
Mr. Baker indicates that he denied the offer to finance the 
equipment and take the same because he had purchased another 
tractor for his use, but he never replaced the rakes. (T.59) 
9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The plaintiff's pleadings failed to give adequate 
notice to the defendant that he was claiming a wrongful 
repossession by the seller which rescinded the contract. The 
failure to give adequate notice in pleadings required that at the 
completion of plaintiff's case, that the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss be granted. 
2. The agreement between the buyer and seller constituted 
a security agreement, since the seller intended to retain an 
interest in the property until he was paid in full. The failure 
of the buyer to obtain financing and pay the defendant within the 
agreed 60 to 90 days constituted a default under their agreement, 
and the seller was then entitled to repossess the equipment. 
3. The trial court abused its discretion by not granting 
to the plaintiff a new trial because of surprise, newly 
discovered evidence, and errors in law. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT 
FOLLOWING THE PLAINTIFF1S CASE. 
The complaint (R.l-2) was filed on June 22, 1987 in the Circuit 
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Court, Box Elder County, Brigham City Department,1 and 
the only substantive allegation in the complaint states: 
"2. that on or about the 7th day of June, 
1986 the Defendant sold to the Plaintiff 
certain equipment more particularly described 
as one International Harvester tractor model 
706 and one pair of John Deere twin rakes 
models 270 and 271 with cart. That Plaintiff 
has paid toward the aforesaid described 
equipment a total of $5500.00 but Defendant 
has failed to deliver said equipment whereby 
the Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount 
of $5500.00 together with interest from and 
after the 7th day of June 1986 at the rate of 
12%." (R.l) 
A General Answer was filed on June 23, 1987 denying that the 
defendant owed any money to the plaintiff. (R.3-4).2 On the 8th 
day of July, 1987 a Notice of Readiness for Trial (R.8-9) was 
signed by A. W. Lauritzen, attorney for plaintiff. No objection 
to the Notice of Readiness was filed, since the defendant was 
prepared to defend himself regarding the issue of "delivery of 
equipment". 
The defendant was served with a "Ten Day Summons" on May 
28, 1987. No complaint was filed until June 22, 1987. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3(a) 
the court had no further jurisdiction and the action 
should have been dismissed. 
2The plaintiff may argue that the defendant waived any right 
to have the action dismissed by filing a general answer, but Rule 
3(a) appears to be jurisdictional in so far as the requirement 
that a complaint be filed within 10 days, see Bawden and 
Associates v. Smith. 624 P.2d 676 (Utah 1981). 
11 
No discovery was submitted by either party in the action. 
On October 6, 1987 a "Notice of Trial Setting" (R.10) was hand 
delivered to Jeff Thorne, attorney for the defendant, stating 
that trial would be held on October 9, 1987. 
At trial, the plaintiff freely admitted that the equipment 
had in fact been delivered to him on or before June 17, 1986 
(T.16). The plaintiff never moved to amend his complaint, nor 
was any notice given to defendant that would put the defendant on 
notice that the plaintiff was claiming a wrongful repossession by 
the seller. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the 
defendant moved to dismiss the action (T.25,34). The trial court 
denied the motion (T.34). 
The defendant with due diligence could not have known prior 
to trial that the plaintiff's position was totally contrary to 
his pleadings. At trial the plaintiff argued a totally different 
theory of his case and claimed that the contract was rescinded by 
the defendant, since the defendant wrongfully repossessed the 
property. (T.25-26). The trial judge, (who appeared not to be 
conversant with the commercial code), questioned whether the 
agreement constituted a "conditional sales contract" and stated 
that no "written" right to repossess was reserved. (T.27,29). 
Under the facts of this case it is clear that the 
plaintiff's pleadings did not afford the defendant an adequate 
opportunity to defend against a "claimed" wrongful repossession. 
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The trial court should have dismissed plaintifffs cause of 
action. See Taylor v E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 
279 (1953). 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BAKER AND 
BARNES WAS A SECURITY AGREEMENT AND 
BARNES WAS ENTITLED TO REPOSSESS 
THE EQUIPMENT WHEN BAKER FAILED TO 
MAKE PAYMENTS. 
A. Security Agreement. 
Barnes sold Baker farm equipment, which after trade-in 
allowances, left Baker owing Barnes $4,500. (T.5). Baker knew 
and agreed that Barnes was retaining an interest in the equipment 
until Barnes was paid. (T.14,16). Mr. Baker agreed to get his 
own financing and pay Mr. Barnes within 60 to 90 days (T.19). 
The Uniform Commercial Code is extremely liberal regarding 
the formal requirements as to what constitutes a "security 
agreement". The reasons for this are that the drafters of the 
Uniform Commercial Code recognized that in actual business 
transactions, buyers and sellers often fail to get complete 
written documents signed, and the drafters felt that it would be 
unfair to penalize a party because he did not have a complete 
written document, see Anderson on Uniform Commercial Code, Vol. 
1, under §2-201, official code comment. 
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 70A-9-105(1)(1) states: 
"Security Agreement" means aa agreement which 
creates or provides for a security interest". 
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"Agreement11 is a defined term under the Commercial Code. 
Section 70A-1-201(3) states: 
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties 
in fact as found in their language or by 
implication from other circumstances 
including course of dealing or usage of trade 
or course of performance as provided in this 
act (sections 70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208). 
Whether an agreement has legal consequences 
is determined by the provisions of this act, 
if applicable; otherwise by the law of 
contracts (section 70A-1-103). (Compare 
"Contract"). 
Thus an "agreement" is basically the parties "bargain". 
"Security interest" is also defined a term. UTAH CODE ANNO. 
70A-1-201(37) states: 
"Security interest" means an interest in 
personal property or fixtures which secures 
payment or performance of an obligation...." 
From the evidence it is clear that the parties intended that 
Dale Barnes would retain an interest in the property until he was 
paid in full,3 and thus, a security agreement existed and the 
parties rights are governed by the Utah Commercial Code. 
B. Legal Contract. 
The statute of frauds provisions of tne Utah Commercial 
Code, see UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-2-201(1) provides for minimal 
The evidence includes: Exhibit A, the sales invoice; Mr. 
Baker's testimony found at: (T.6 1.17-20) (T.7 1.18-22) 
(T.8 1.1-3) (T.14 1.21-24) (T.16,17) (T.19,1.18-24) 
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requirements to have an enforceable contract. These minimum 
legal requirements are: 
(a) A writing; 
(b) Signed by the party against who it is enforced; 
(c) A description of the collateral. 
Exhibit A sets forth all formal requirements, except that it 
is not signed by Mr. Baker. However, UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-2-
201(3)(b) provides: 
"A contract which does not satisfy the 
requirements of subsection (1) but which is 
valid in other respects is enforceable...(b) 
if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleadings, testimony or 
otherwise in court that a contract for sale 
was made,..." 
The formal requirements for a contract have clearly been met 
inasmuch as plaintifffs Exhibit A evidences the agreement between 
the parties; Carl Baker received the tractor and rakes and traded 
in a swather and side rake and admitted that he owed Dales Barnes 
$4,500.00. Additionally Carl Baker admitted in his pleadings and 
in his testimony that an agreement existed and Dale Barnes 
claimed an interest in the equipment. Therefore, there can be no 
dispute that a "legal contract" and "security agrement" existed 
between the plaintiff and defendant. 
C. Default 
The testimony at court relating to time of payment can best 
be summarized by saying at the time of purchase, Mr. Baker stated 
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he would arrange his own financing and Mr. Barnes was willing to 
let him do it. The question then becomes, how long did Baker 
have to get financing arranged? 
By his own admission, Baker acknowledged that he recognized 
he would have to pay the $4,500 within a reasonable time (T.17) 
and that at the time of sale he told Mr. Barnes it would probably 
take 60 to 90 days to get his financing. {T.19 1.18-24). 
Mr. Barnes testified he tried eight or ten times in vehicles 
and probably "30 or 40 on the telephone" to get Baker to pay him 
or finance the equipment. (T.40). 
Mr. Baker had the equipment the entire growing year of 1986 
(T.23). After waiting until at least September 15, 1986,4 Mr. 
Baker repossessed the equipment. 
By the evidence most favorable to Baker, after September 7, 
1986 he was in default. 
D. Right to Repossess 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-9-501 provides: 
"(1) When a debtor is in default under a 
security agreement, a secured party has the 
rights and remedies provided in this part... 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-9-503 states: 
"Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has 
on default the right to take possession of 
4There was conflicting testimony as to the time of 
repossession. Mr. Baker said September 15, 1986, Mr. 
Barnes said November 15, 1986. The trial court found 
September 15, 1986 to be the date of repossession. 
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the collateral. In taking possession a 
secured party may proceed without judicial 
process if this can be done without breach of 
the peace or may proceed by action. If the 
security agreement so provides the secured 
party may require the debtor to assemble the 
collateral and make it available to the 
secured party at a place to be designated by 
the secured party which is reasonably 
convenient to both parties. Without removal 
a secured party may render equipment unusable 
and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's 
premises under section 70A-9-504. If a 
secured party elects to proceed by process of 
law he may proceed by writ of replevin or 
otherwise." 
Barnes had the right to repossess the equipment upon 
default. see Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 
(1971). 
After his equipment was repossessed, Baker knew Barnes had 
picked up the equipment (T.62). Mr. Barnes then sent two letters 
to Baker advising him of the repossession (Ex. 1 and 2) and 
allowing Baker to have the equipment by paying the agreed price. 
The Uniform Commercial Code, UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-l-203 also 
provides: 
"Every contract or duty within this act 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
performance or enforcement.11 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-1-201(19) states: 
"Good faith" means honesty in fact in the 
conduct or transaction concerned." 
It stretches one's sense of honesty to believe the buyer 
could use the equipment all growing season, never arrange 
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financing, know it has been repossessed by the seller and be able 
to get away with it. The seller offered to allow the buyer to 
complete the contract by paying the balance owed, but the buyer 
refused and then sued to get the trade-in allowance from the 
seller. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth 
grounds for granting a new trial. Clearly, on three of these 
grounds a new trial was justified. These three grounds are: 
"...(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial.... 
(7) Error in law." 
As was argued in Point 1 of appellant's brief, the plaintiff 
claimed that the machinery was never "delivered", but at trial 
claimed the plaintiff wrongfully repossessed the equipment and 
thus rescinded the contract. This clearly constituted surprise. 
Because of the pleadings the defendant was unaware that the 
question of when repossession took place was in dispute; also 
because of the pleadings Barnes was unaware that the question of 
whether Baker was actually seeking financing would be relevant. 
Accordingly no testimony from Commercial Security Bank's, Harry 
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Willmore, was obtained which would have stated that no actual 
progress towards paying Mr. Barnes took place in the summer or 
fall of 1986, and further to get additional proof showing 
repossession took place in November 1986 instead of September 
1986. Thus newly discovered evidence was discovered which 
justified a new trial. 
The trial court made numerous errors in law regarding what 
constitutes a "security agreement", "default" and the "right to 
repossess". Thus errors in law took place, justifying a new 
trial. 
For these reasons the trial court abused in discretion in 
not granting a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the trial court and order that the 
plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, and the defendant be awarded 
his costs and expenses. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1988. 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
By 
Jeff R. Thorne 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 1988, I 
mailed four (4) copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to 
A, W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Plaintiff, 226 North 100 East, 
P. 0. Box 171, Logan, Utah 84321. 
Jeff R. Thome 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CROSS ROADS • TREMONTON. UTAH 84337 • PHON£-257?lW 
May 6, 1987 
Carl Baker 
460 W 200 No 
Hyrum, Utah 
84319 
Dear Carl, 
I talked with the Bankers today and we decided if you would like to have the machinery 
which we repossed (IHC Farmal Model 706, Serial #7780SY) and the pair of John Deere 
.twin rakes with rake cart (rake model 270 serial #5259246E) you may have them by 
simply paying off the balance of our contract with a reasonable rate of interest 
at the date of your check. 
Sincerely, 
Dale Barnes 
dba Barnes Equipment 
980 W. Main 
Tremonton, Utah 84337 
CC: Zions First National Bank 
c/o Clain Tanner 
First Security Bank 
c/o Brent Dickerson 
Mann, Hadfield & Thorn 
Attorneys at Law 
Jack H. Molgard 
Attorney at Law 
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A. W. Lauritzen (1906) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
32S North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
CARL BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE BARNES dba BARNES, 
EQUIPMENT, 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) S7300183CV 
This matter came on for hearing on the 9th day of October, 
1987, before the Honorable Robert W. Daines, Circuit Judge and 
the court having heard evidence and having examined the file and 
exhibits having been introduced into evidence and the court 
having examined the same and the court being fully advised of the 
premises the court now makes and enters the following; 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Cache County, State of Utah* 
2. Defendant is a resident of Box Elder County, Sate of 
Utah. 
3. The amount in controversy is less than $10,000.00 
exclusive of costs and interest. 
4. That on or about the 7th day of June, 1986 the 
Defendant sold to the Plaintiff "farm equipment .valued at 
24 
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$.10,000.00. 
5. Plaintiff made payment to the Defendant on said 
equipment in the amount of $5,500.00 by trading in other 
equipment at an agreed price, which equipment had a value of 
$5,500.00. 
6. That a balance of $4,500.00 remained to be paid by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant. 
7. The Defendant surrendered possession of the equipment 
subject of this transaction to the Plaintiff and Plaintiff 
surrendered possession of the trade in equipment to the 
Defendant. 
8. That it was contemplated by the parties that some time 
would elapse prior to Plaintiff paying the balance. 
9. Each of the parties, Plaintiff and Defendant made 
efforts to obtain financing in order that the Plaintiff could pay 
the balance. 
10. That in the month of September 1987, without giving 
notice to the Plaintiff, the Defendant took possession of the 
equipment previously sold and delivered to Plaintiff. 
11. The Plaintiff upon discovery of the loss of his 
equipment attempted to contact the Defendant, but was unable to 
locate him. 
12. The Plaintiff, in need of equipment and after enduring 
a substantial amount of time without the use of the equipment 
purchased from Defendant, bought other equipment to replace the 
equipment taken by Defendant. 
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13. That Plaintiff ultimately contacted the Defendant in 
the Spring of 1987 to inquire about the disposition of the 
equipment but was told by the Defendant that Defendant had to 
repossess the equipment and it was no longer available and that 
Defendant owed Plaintiff nothing. 
14. Thereafter a letter was written by Defendant to 
Plaintiff stating that Plaintiff would be allowed to reclaim the 
equipment upon payment of $4,500.00 plus interest from June of 
1986. 
15. Defendant again tendered return of the equipment upon 
payment of the balance plus interest at the time of trial. 
IS. That Plaintiff refused the offer each time it was made 
on the ground that he had replaced the equipment with other 
equipment and had no need for the equipment. 
17. That the Defendant unilaterally elected to rescind the 
sale. 
18. That on account of the unilateral election to rescind 
the Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $5,500,00. 
19. Upon payment by the Defendant to the Plaintiff of 
$5, 500.00 the parties will be in the same relative position as at 
inception of the transaction which is the subject of this action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes and 
enters the following; 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That at the time of Defendant's retaking of the 
equipment sold to the Plaintiff, the Defendant did not have the 
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legal right to possession of the equipment. 
2. The rights of possession in this case is controlled by 
70A-9-203 UCA as amended. 
3. The Plaintiff as the aggrieved party had the right to 
treat the wrongful acts of the Defendant in retaking the property 
from the lawful possession of the Plaintiff as a unilateral 
rescission and to require the Defendant to once again place the 
Plaintiff in his original position. 
4. That as the Defendant sold the trade in equipment and 
the Plaintiff has mitigated his damages by replacement of the 
equipment; the most equitable way to place Plaintiff in his prior 
position is to award him judgment equal to the value of his 
payments to the Defendant. 
5. That the amount required to restore the Plaintiff to his 
original position taking into account the use of the equipment by 
the Plaintiff and the deprivation of the use of the equipment on 
account of the acts of the Defendant is $5,500.00. 
6. The judgment should bear interest at 12%. 
7. The Plaintiff should have his costs. 
DATED this ~7 day of I ^ f e w , 1987. 
Robert W. Daines 
Circuit Court Judge 
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A. W. Lauritzen (1906) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
32S North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
CARL BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE BARNES dba BARNES, 
EQUIPMENT, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
87300183CV 
This matter came on for hearing on the 9th day of October 
1987 before the Honorable Robert W. Daines sitting without a jury 
and the issues having been duly tried and the court having made 
it Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff take judgment 
against the Defendant in the amount of $5, 500.00 with said 
judgment to bear interest at 12% and costs to Plaintiff in the 
amount of $53.00. 
DATED th: 
CIRCUIT JUDGE 
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Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #3250 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box "F" 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
CARL BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE BARNES dba BARNES 
EQUIPMENT, 
Defendant. 
) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
) Civil No. 873001S3CV 
This matter came on for hearing on the 3rd day of 
February, 1988 pursuant to the defendant's Motion for New 
Trial. The court heard the arguments of counsel for the 
defendant and counsel for the plaintiff, and the court 
having specifically found that the Motion for New Trial was 
timely filed for the reason that the original Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree had been 
objected to and that no notice of the signings of the 
original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
and Decree was given to the defendant until January 8, 1988, 
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and the Motion for New Trial was filed with the court on the 
18th day of December, 1987. The court having first found 
that the Motion was timely filed, but having considered the 
Motion, denies the defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
DATED this >?37 <*ay of February, 1988. 
<ODertTW. Darnes 
Circuit Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the w day of February, 
1988, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial to A. W. Lauritzen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, P. 0„ Box 171, Logan, Utah 84321, 
n 
£<LsrtS? Q ; 
Secretary / 
2L fTj-^C 
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Je f f R. Thome of Mann, Hadf ie ld & Thorne, #3250 
At to rneys for Defendant 
Zions Bank B u i l d i n g , 98 North Main 
P. 0 . Box "F" 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
CARL BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE BARNES dba BARNES 
EQUIPMENT, 
Defendant. 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. 8 730018 3CV 
Comes now the defendant, Dale Barnes dba Barnes 
Equipment, and appeals from the Judgment and Decree entered 
on the 7th day of December, 1987, together with the Order 
denying the defendant's Motion for New Trial entered on the 
25th day of February, 1988. This appeal is taken from the 
First Circuit Court, Box Elder County, Brigham City 
Department. 
This appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals of the 
State of Utah. 
DATED this l*j day of February, 1988. 
Jef'^R/ Thorne"" 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF I4AILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of February, 19 88 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to A. W. 
Lauritzen, Attorney for Plaintiff, P. 0 Box 171, Logan, Utah 
84321. 
Secre£3?r^ (J 
